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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
makes alternative dispositions," and as Mrs. Price had provided for a
gift over of the property should her first desire be defeated, "cy pres"
could not be applied here. Since inadequacy of resources could not
affect the validity of the trust in the case we are discussing,12 the plan
which the testatrix prescribed should be carried out to the extent of
the available funds.' 3 It is true that the Welfare Board must approve
the organization of homes supported by private subscriptions; '4 still,
as that body lacks jurisdiction in the monetary affairs of these proj-
ects, 15 it cannot justify a refusal of its consent for any financial
reasons.1 Equity is adverse to defeat gifts to charity which are not
impossible to be realized. When a decedent's intent is clearly evi-
denced, the law will substitute no different use which an outside
intelligence might dictate.' 7
H. G. S.
TRUSTS-REvoCATION-PERSONS BENEFICIALLY INTERESTED-
UNBORN CHILDREN AS CONTINGENT REMAINDERMEN.-In January,
1929, the plaintiff executed a deed of trust and delivered it, with the
property therein described, to the defendant, the trustee named in the
deed. The deed of trust provided that the income should be applied
for the benefit of the settlor's daughter, Irene M. Hanlon, and that
"lIn re Fletcher's Estate, 280 N. Y. 86, 91, 19 N. E. (2d) 794, 795 (1939),
14 C. J. S., Charities § 52, 10 AM. Juais., Charities § 124, motion denied, 280
N. Y. 800 (1939). Judge Hill's dissenting opinion as well as the majority
holding in the principal case concur with this theory. But cf. notes 7, 8, 9,
supra.
12 In re Nelson's Estate, 143 Misc. 843, 258 N. Y. Supp. 667 (1932);
Taylor v. Columbia University, 226 U. S. 126, 33 Sup. Ct 73, 57 L. ed. 152
(1912) ; accord, note 13, infra.
'3 Wilson v. First Nat. Bank of Independence, 164 Iowa 402, 145 N. W.
948, Ann. Cases 1916D 481 (1914) ; cf. note 12, supra. Judge Hill, however,
dissented in the instant case because he feared lest the home become a burden
on the state.
14 SOCIAL WELFARE LAW § 35; "no certificate of incorporation shall here-
after be filed which has for its purpose the establishment or maintenance of any
home or institution for invalid, aged or indigent persons, except with the writ-
ten permission of the board and of a justice of the supreme court endorsed on
or annexed to the certificate of incorporation." Cf. note 15, infra. But see
note 16, infra.
15 SOCIAL WELFARE LAW § 21, subd. 2; N. Y. CousT. Art. XVII, § 2: "As
to institutions not in receipt of public funds . . . the state board of social
welfare shall make inspections, but solely as to matters directly affecting the
health, safety, treatment and training of their inmates." Cf. note 14, supra.
But see note 16, infra.
16 Capricious denial of incorporation would be subject to Supreme Court
review. Accord, notes 14, 15, supra.
17 Accord, notes 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, supra. But see the dissenting opinion in the
case we are discussing.
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RECENT DECISIONS
the principal was to be paid over to her upon the death of the settlor.
In the event that the daughter should predecease the settlor, then,
under the provisions of the trust, at the death of the settlor, the prin-
cipal was to be paid over to P. Edward Hanlon, the son of the settlor,
if living, but if dead, then to his lawful issue, if any, but if he should
die without issue, then the principal was to be paid over to the legal
representatives of the settlor. The settlor, having reserved no power
of revocation, has obtained the consent in writing of the daughter and
the son, both of whom are living and inmarried, and has given notice
to the trustee of her intention to revoke the trust.1 The trustee,
whose consent is not required to effect a revocation,2 has contested
the application on the ground that children that P. Edward Hanlon
might have, who would take contingent remainders under the terms of
the deed of trust, and the legal representatives of the settlor have
beneficial interests in the trust and have not consented. Held, that
all parties beneficially interested in the trust have consented to its
revocation. Smith v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., as Trustee, and
Irene M. H. Farrell, et al., 287 N. Y. 500, 41 N. E. (2d) 72 (1942).
By the terms of the trust deed, children that P. Edward Hanlon
might have, took contingent remainders.3 A contingent remainder is
a beneficial interest as defined in the Personal Property Law.4 In
order to effect a revocation, the plaintiff contended that P. Edward
Hanlon, by representation, could consent to the revocation for him-
self and also for any children he might have.5 But although a person
can consent to the destruction of a beneficial interest that he may have
in a trust and in so doing deprive his heirs of an expected benefit, he
cannot by his consent destroy an interest, even of his own descen-
dants, derived directly from the trust instrument and not from the
ancestor by succession.6 If, therefore, there were contingent remain-
dermen, who, being unascertained, could not consent to the revoca-
tion, then the trust must stand. The court, however, seriously ques-
•N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 23. "Upon the consent in writing of all the
persons beneficially interested in a trust in personal property or any part
thereof heretofore or hereafter created, the creator of such trust may revoke
the same as to the whole or such part thereof, and thereupon the estate of the
trustee shall cease in the whole or such part thereof." In re Carnegie's Estate,
203 App. Div. 91, 196 N. Y. Supp. 502, aff'd, 236 N. Y. 517, 142 N. E. 266
(1st Dep't 1922). See also N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 118.
2 "The incidental benefit that the trust company may derive from commis-
sions is not of such a character as gives it a vested right to the continuance of
the trust." Aranyi v. Bankers Trust Co., 201 App. Div. 706, 194 N. Y. Supp.
614 (1st Dep't 1922) ; Phelps v. Thomson, et al., 119 Misc. 875, 198 N. Y. Supp.
320 (1922).
3 N. Y. REAL PRoP. LAw § 40.
4 Robinson v. N. Y. Life Ins. Trust Co., et al., 75 Misc. 361, 133 N. Y.
Supp. 257 (1911).
5 Tonnele v. Wetmore, et al., 195 N. Y. 436, 88 N. E. 1068 (1909) ; Kent v.
Church of St. Michael, 136 N. Y. 10, 32 N. E. 704 (1892).
0 Schoellkopf v. Marine Trust Co. of Buffalo, 267 N. Y. 358, 196 N. E. 288
(1935).
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tioned the proposition that unborn contingent remaindermen had
beneficial interests that required their consent to the revocation.7 This
proposition has often been discussed in the lower courts,8 but recent
decisions in the Court of Appeals have purposely avoided the issue.9
Following the rule set down in the lower courts, it was held here that
persons as yet unborn had no beneficial interest in the continuation of
the trust and that the trust could be revoked with the consent of all
parties beneficially interested therein who were in being. The lack of
consent of these unborn remaindermen was the primary cause moti-
vating the trustee's opposition to the revocation. No serious objec-
tion was raised over the absence of consent of the personal representa-
tives of the settlor. These, of course, could not be ascertained until
the death of the settlor, as no one is heir to the living.' 0 The difficult
question as to whether the settlor reserved a reversion in herself or
created a contingent remainder in her personal representatives was
not raised. Under the common law, a remainder to the grantor's
own heirs created a reversion in him in every instance." However, in
New York today, this rule has become one of construction and is
followed only where there is an absence of clarity and intent in creat-
ing the remainder.' 2
P. J. H.
WILLS-EFFECT OF PENAL LAW § 511 ON DECEDENT ESTATE
LAW § 83.-In July, 1937, Marguerite Lindewall, the decedent, mar-
ried one Paul Bathelt in the State of New York. They resided in
New York City until June, 1938, when Bathelt pleaded guilty to
murder in the second degree and was sentenced to imprisonment for
7 In the principal case, Lehman, J., states at p. 504, "The words 'persons
beneficially interested' must be strained beyond their usual and natural meaning
if construed to include those not in being who might in some contingency be
entitled to an estate."
8 Beam v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 182, 288
N. Y. Supp. 403 (1st Dep't 1936) ; Thatcher v. Empire Trust Co., 243 App.
Div. 430, 277 N. Y. Supp. 874 (1st Dep't 1935) ; Corbett v. Bank of New York
and Trust Co., 229 App. Div. 570, 242 N. Y. Supp. 638 (1st Dep't 1930) ; Cram
v. Walker, 173 App. Div. 804 (1st Dep't 1916).9 Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 280 N. Y. 43, 19 N. E. (2d)
673 (1939) ; see note 6 mtpra.
10 Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919). But see Moore
v. Littel, 41 N. Y. 66 (1869).
11 Co. LITT. 22b; Robinson v. Blankenship, 116 Tenn. 394, 92 S. W. 854
(1906).
12 Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank and Trust Co., 260 N. Y. 539, 184 N. E. 83
(1932); Doctor v. Hughes, cited supra note 10. For cases holding that a
remainder was created see Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, cited
supra note 9; Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York, 250 N. Y. 298,
165 N. E. 454 (1929); Gage v. Irving Bank and Trust Co., 248 N. Y. 554, 162
N. E. 522 (1928).
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